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1. Introduction
Engineering management is a management process that blends of engineering and business
processes. As such the ability to make decision as well as model the decision making process
may be critical steps in the process. In game theory, we employ the process to gain insights
into possible courses of action from each player assuming the players are rational, that is they
want to maximize their gains.
In many business situations, two or more decision makers simultaneously and without
communications choose courses of actions, and the action chosen by each affects the payoff or
gains earned by all the other players. For example, consider a fast food chain such as Burger
King. If they choose an advertising strategy with pricing not only do they help their payoffs
but their choices affect all other fast food chains. Each company’s decision affect the revenues,
profits, of loses of the other fast food chains.
Game theory is useful in analyzing decisions in cases where two or more decision makers have
conflicting interest. Most of what we present here concerns only the two person game but we
will also briefly examine the n-person game.
In two person games, each of the players has strategies or courses of action that they might
choose. These courses of action lead to outcomes or payoffs to the decision maker and these
payoffs might be any values (positive, negative, or zero). These payoffs are usually presented
in a payoff matrix such as the general one presented in Table 1. In table 1 player 1, whom we
will call Rose, might have m course of actions available and player 2, whom we will call Colin,
may have n courses of actions available. These payoffs values might have come from ordinal
utilities or cardinal utilities. For more information about obtaining payoff values please see
the additional reading (Straffin, 2004; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2004).
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Game theory is the branch of mathematics and decision theory concerned with strategic
decisions when two or more players compete. The problems of interest involve multiple
participants, each of whom has individual strategies related to a common system or shared
resources. Because game theory arose from the analysis of competitive scenarios, the problems
are called games and the participants are called players. But these techniques apply to more than
just sport, and are not even limited to competitive situations. In short, game theory deals with
any problem in which each player’s strategy depends on what the other players do. Situations
involving interdependent decisions arise frequently, in all walks of life. A few examples in
which game theory might be used include:
• Friends choosing where to go have dinner
• Couples deciding between going to ballet or a sporting event
• Parents trying to get children to behave
• Commuters deciding how best to travel to work
• Businesses competing in a fair market
• Diplomats negotiating a treaty
• Gamblers betting in a game of chance
• Military strategists weighing alternatives, such as attack or defend
• Governmental diplomacy options for sanctions or actions
• Pitcher-batter duel in baseball or penalty kicker-goalie duel in soccer
All of these situations call for strategic thinking, making use of available information to devise
the best plan to achieve one’s objectives. Perhaps you are already familiar with assessing costs
and benefits in order to make informed decisions between several options. Game theory simply
extends this concept to interdependent decisions, in which the options being evaluated are
functions of the players’ choices or their utility.
Player 1, Rose’s
Strategies
Player 2, Colin’s
Strategies
Column 1 Column 2 … Column n
Row 1 M1,1,N1,1 M1,2N1,2 … M1,nN1,n
Row 2 M2,1N2,1 M22,N22 … M2,n,N2,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Row m Mm,1,Nm,1 Mm,2Nm,2 … Mm,n,Nm,n
Table 1. Payoff Matrix, M, of a two-person total conflict game
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Consider the situation where two major discount stores want to come into the same region.
We will call these two major discount stores, Target and Wal-Mart. Each store can decide
whether to build their store in the region’s larger city or in the region’s smaller city. The stores
desire the bigger market share of the consumers that yields more profits for their respective
company. Experts have estimated the market share in the region for the larger and smaller city
building options based upon 100% of the consumer market and income of the region. Based
upon this market research, table 1, what decisions should each store make? As we will show
later in this chapter, the best decision for each store is to locate in the larger city.
Wal-Mart
Large City Small City
Target Large City (60,40) (75,25)
Small City (50,50) (58,42)
Table 2. Target versus Wal-Mart
Two types of games will be presented in this chapter: total conflict games and partial conflict
games. Game theory then is the study of decisions where the outcome to the decision maker
depends not only on what he does, but the decision of one or more additional players. We
classify the games depending upon whether the conflict between the players is total or
partial. A total conflict game is a game where the sum of values in each cell of the payoff matrix,
Mij+Nij either always equals 0 or always equals the same constant for each ij pair. In a partial
conflict game, this sum does not always equal 0 or the same constant. We begin our discussion
with the total conflict game described in Table 1.
2. Two–person total conflict games
We begin with characteristics of the two-person total conflict game:
1. There are two persons (called the row player who we will refer to as Rose and the column
player who we will refer to as Colin).
2. Rose must choose 1 of m strategies and Colin must choose one of n strategies.
3. If Rose chooses the ith strategy and Colin the jth strategy then Rose receives a payoff of
aij and Colin loses an amount aij.
4. There are two types of possible solutions. Pure strategy solutions are when each player
achieves their best outcomes by always choosing the same strategy in repeated games.
Mixed strategy solutions are when players play a random selection of their strategies in
order to obtain their best outcomes in repeated games.
Games might be presented either in decision tree or payoff format. In a decision tree for
sequential games, we look ahead and reason back. In simultaneous games, we use payoff
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matrices as shown in Table 1. This is a total conflict game if and only Mi,j+Ni,j equals either 0
or the same constant for all i and j.
For example, if a player wins x when the other player loses x then their sum is zero or in business
marketing strategy based upon 100% if one player get x% of the market then the other player
gets y% such that their sum is x%+y%=100. Given a simple payoff matrix we look for the Nash
equilibrium as the solution first with movement diagrams.
Example 1 Target versus Wal-Mart
Suppose Large City is located near Small City. Now assume a smaller grocery store such as
Target will locate a franchise in either Large City or Small City. Further, a “mega grocery store”
franchise such as Wal-Mart is making the same decision – they will locate either in Large City
or Small City. Analysts have estimated the market shares and we place both sets of payoffs in
a single game matrix. Listing the row player’s payoffs first, we have the payoff as shown in
Table 2. We apply the movement diagram, were we draw arrows in each row (vertical arrow)
and column (horizontal arrow) from the smaller payoff to the larger payoff.
 
  Wal-
Mart 
 
 Large City  Small City 
         Large City 60, 40  75, 25 
Target    
          Small City 50, 50  58, 42 
 
Table 3. Payoff matrix for example 1
Note all arrows point into the payoff (60,40) at (Large City, Large City) strategies for both
players and no arrow exits that outcome, see Table 3. This indicates that neither player can
unilaterally improve their solution. This stable situation is called a Nash Equilibrium. Often
payoff matrices and movement diagrams may get convoluted or the arrows do not point to
one or more points. In those more complex two-person games we offer linear programming
as the solution method.
3. Linear programming of total conflict games
Every total conflict game may be formulated as a linear programming problem. Consider a
total conflict two person game in which maximizing player X has m strategies and minimizing
player Y has n strategies. The entry (Mij,Nij) from the ith row and jth column of the payoff
matrix represents the payoff for those strategies. We present the following formulation using
the elements of M for the maximizing a player that provides results for the value of the game
and the probabilities xi (Fox, 2010; Fox, 2012; Winston, 2003). We note that if there are negative
values in the payoff matrix then we need a slight modification to the formulation. We suggest
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the method by Winston (2003) to replace any variable that could take on negative values with
the difference in two positive variables, V j −V ' j . We only assume that the value of the game
could be positive or negative. The other values we are looking for are probabilities that are
always non-negative.
Maximize V
Subject to
1,1 1 2,1 2 ,1
2,1 1 2,2 2 ,2
,1 1 ,2 2 ,
1 2
... 0
... 0
...
... 0
... 1
m n
m n
m m m n n
n
N x N x N x V
N x N x N x V
N x N x N x V
x x x
Nonnegativity
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + =
(1)
where the weights xi yields Rose’s strategy and the value of V is the value of the game to Colin.
Maximize v
Subject to
1,1 1 2,1 2 ,1
2,1 1 2,2 2 ,2
,1 1 ,2 2 ,
1 2
... 0
... 0
...
... 0
... 1
m n
m n
m m m n n
n
M y M y M y v
M y M y M y v
M y M y M y v
y y y
Nonnegativity
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + =
(2)
where the weights yi yield Colin’s strategy and the value of v is the value of the game to Rose.
Our two formulations for this problem are for Rose and Colin, respectively:
Maximize Vc
Subject to:
40 x1 + 50x2−V c ≥0
25x1 + 42x2−V c ≥0
x1 + x2 =1
x1, x2, V c ≥0
Maximize Vr
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Subject to:
60 y1 + 75y2−V r ≥0
50y1 + 58y2−V r ≥0
y1 + y2 =1
y1, y2, V r ≥0
If we put our example into our two formulations and solve, we get the solution y1=1,y2=0 and
Vr=60 from formulation (1) and x1=1,x2=0, and Vc=40 from formulation (2). The overall solution
is (Large City, Large City) with value (60,40).
4. Constant–sum to zero–sum
The primal-dual only works in the zero-sum game format. We may convert this game to the
zero-sum game format to obtain. Since this is a constant sum game, all outcomes sum to 100.
This can be converted to a zero sum game through the positive linear function, y=x-20. Use
any two pairs of points and obtain the equation of the line and then make the slope positive.
Using this transformation x1=x-20 we can obtain the payoffs for the row player in the zero-sum
game. The new zero-sum payoff matrix may be written as follows:
 
  Target  
  Large City Small City 
Wal-Mart Large City 40  55 
 Small City 
30  
38 
Table 4. Add Caption
For a zero-sum game we can again look at movement diagrams, dominance, or linear pro‐
gramming. If one Rose’s information is present representing the zero sum game then only
assume Colin’s values are the negative of Rose’s. We apply the movement diagram as before
and place the arrows accordingly. The arrows point in and never leave 40. The large city, large
city strategy is the stable pure strategy solution. We define dominance as:
A strategy A dominates a strategy B if every outcome in A is at least as good as the corre‐
sponding outcome in B, and at least one outcome in A is strictly better than the corresponding
outcome in B. Dominance Principle: A rational player should never play a dominated strategy
in a total conflict game.
In this case the small city strategy payoffs for Rose are dominated by the large city strategy
payoffs, thus we would never play small city. For Colin, the large city is better than the small
city, so the large city dominates. Since large city, large city is the dominate strategy the solution
is (40,-40).
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If we use linear programming we only need a single formulation of the linear program. The
row player maximizes and the column player minimizes with rows’ values. This constitutes a
primal and dual relationship. The linear program used for Rose in the zero-sum games is:
Maximize V
Subject to:
1,1 1 1,2 2 1,
2,1 1 2,2 2 2,
,1 1 ,2 2 ,
1 2
... 0
... 0
.
.
.
... 0
... 1
, 0
n n
n n
m m m n n
n
i
a x a x a x V
a x a x a x V
a x a x a x V
x x x
V x
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + - ³
+ + + =
³
(3)
where V is the value of the game, am,n are payoff-matrix entries, and x’s are the weights
(probabilities to play the strategies). We place these payoffs into our formulation:
Max Vr
Subject to:
40x1 + 30x2−V r ≥0
55x1 + 38x2−V r ≥0
x1 + x2 =1
x1, x2, V r ≥0
The optimal solution strategies found are identical as before with both players choosing Large
City as their best strategy. This indicates that neither player can unilaterally improve, a stable
situation that we refer to as a Nash Equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium is an outcome where neither player can benefit by departing unilaterally
from its strategy associated with that outcome.
We conclude our discussion of total conflict games with the analysis that linear programming
may always be used all total conflict games but is most suitable for large games between two
players each having many strategies (Fox, 2010; Fox 2012).
5. Two–person partial conflict games
In the previous example, the conflict between the decision makers was total in the sense that
neither player could improve without hurting the other player. If that is not the case, we classify
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the game as partial conflict as illustrated in the next example. Assume we have new market
share analysis for our two stores as shown in Table 3 where the sums are not all equal to same
constant.
Wal-Mart
Large City Small City
Large City 65, 25
 
50, 45
Target
  
Small City 55, 40
 
62, 28
Table 5. Revised market shares
We begin with the movement diagram where the arrows do not find a stable point. In those
cases, we need to find the equalizing strategies to find the Nash equilibrium. Other solution
methods are found in the additional reading, we will describe only the use of linear program‐
ming as the method to use when the movement diagram fails to yield a stable point. Addi‐
tionally, Gillman and Housman (2009) state that every partial conflict game also has equalizing
strategy equilibrium even if it also has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Since both players are maximizing their payoffs we use the linear programming formulation
presented as equation (1) and (2).
This yields two separate linear programs.
Maximize V
Subject to:
65 y1 +  50 y2 –V ≥0
55 y1 +  62 y2 –V ≥0
y1 + y2 =1
y1, y2,  V ≥0
The solution is y1=6/11, y2=5/11 and V=58.182
The other second LP formulation is
Maximize v
Subject to:
25 x1 +  40 x2 –v ≥0
45 x1 +  28 x2 –v ≥0
x1 + x2 =1
x1, x2,  v ≥0
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The solution is x1=17/32, x2=15/32 and v=34.375.
The results state that the two stores must play their two strategies each a proportion of the
time that they compete in order to obtain their best outcomes.
Another option available in partial conflict games is to consider allowing cooperation and
communications between the game’s players. This allows for first moves, threats, promises,
and combinations of threats and promises in order to obtain better outcomes. We call this
strategic moves (Straffin, 2004).
6. Moving first or committing to move first
We now assume both players can communicate their plans or their moves to the second player.
If Target can move first they can choose Large City or Small City. Examining the movement
diagram, they should expect Wal-Mart’s responses as follows:
If Target plays Large City, Wal-Mart plays Small City resulting in the outcome (50,45).
If Target plays Small City, Wal-Mart plays Large City plays resulting in the outcome (55,40).
Target prefers 55 to 50 so they would play Small City. If Target forces Wal-Mart to move first
then the choices are between (65,25) and (62,28) of which Wal-Mart prefers (62,28). Having
Wal-Mart to move first gets Target a better outcome. How to get this to occur as well as the
credibility of the first move is a concern.
7. Issuing a Threat
In general we describe the concept of issuing a threat. Rose may have a threat to deter Colin
from playing a particular strategy. A threat must satisfy three conditions:
Conditions for a Threat by Rose
1. Rose communicates that she will play a certain strategy contingent upon a previous action
of Colin.
2. Rose’s action is harmful to Rose.
3. Rose’s action is harmful to Colin.
In our game example there is no valid threat.
We present the classic game of chicken to show a valid threat.
In the game of Chicken, Rose wants Colin to play Swerve. Therefore she makes the threat on
Colin’s Not Swerve to deter him from choosing that strategy. Examining the movement
diagram,
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Normally, if Colin plays Not Swerve, Rose plays Swerve yielding (2, 4)
In order to harm herself, Rose must play Not Swerve. Thus the potential threat must take the
form:
If Colin plays Not Swerve, then Rose plays Not Swerve yielding (1, 1).
Is it a threat? It is contingent upon Colin choosing Not Swerve. Comparing (2, 4) and (1, 1), we
see that the threat is harmful to Rose and is harmful to Colin. It is a threat and effectively
eliminates the outcome (2, 4) making the game,
Table 7. Chicken game with a threat.
Colin still has a choice of choosing Swerve or Not Swerve. Using the movement diagram, he
analyzes his choices as follows:
If Colin selects Swerve, Rose chooses Not Swerve yielding (4, 2).
If Colin chooses Not Swerve, Rose chooses Not Swerve yielding (1, 1) (because of Rose’s threat).
Thus Colin’s choice is between a payoff of 2 and 1. He should choose Swerve yielding (4, 2).
If Rose can make her threat credible, she can secure her best outcome.
8. Issuing a promise
In our Target versus Wal-Mart game there is no promise, so again we illustrate with the classic
game of chicken. Again, if Colin has the opportunity to move first or is committed to (or
possibly considering) Not Swerve, Rose may have a promise to encourage Colin to play Swerve
instead. A promise must satisfy three conditions:
Colin
Swerve Not Swerve
Swerve (3, 3) (2,4)
Rose
Not Swerve (4, 2) (1, 1)
Table 6. Chicken Game
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Conditions for a Promise by Rose
1. Rose communicates that she will play a certain strategy contingent upon a previous action
of Colin.
2. Rose’s action is harmful to Rose.
3. Rose’s action is beneficial to Colin.
In the game of Chicken, Rose wants Colin to play Swerve. Therefore she makes the promise
on Colin Swerve to sweeten the pot so he will choose Swerve. Examining the movement
diagram,
Normally, if Colin plays Swerve, Rose plays Not Swerve yielding (4, 2).
In order to harm herself, she must play Swerve. Thus the promise takes the form:
If Colin plays Swerve, then Rose plays Swerve yielding (3, 3).
Is it a promise? It is contingent upon Colin choosing Swerve. Comparing the normal (4, 2) with
the promised (3, 3), we see that the promise is harmful to Rose and is beneficial to Colin. It is
a promise and effectively eliminates the outcome (4, 2) making the game,
Colin
Swerve Not Swerve
Swerve (3, 3)
 
(2, 4)
Rose
 
Not Swerve Eliminated by Promise (1, 1)
Table 8. Chicken game with a promise.
Colin still has a choice of choosing Swerve or Not Swerve. Using the movement diagram, he
analyzes his choices as follows:
If Colin selects Swerve, Rose chooses Swerve yielding (3, 3) as promised.
If Colin chooses Not Swerve, Rose chooses Swerve yielding (2, 4).
Thus Colin’s choice is between payoffs of 3 and 4. He should choose Not Swerve yielding (2,
4). Rose does have a promise. But her goal is for Colin to choose Swerve. Even with the promise
eliminating an outcome, Colin chooses Not Swerve. The promise does not work. If both make
a promise then perhaps (3, 3) is the outcome.
In summary, the game of Chicken offers many options. If the players choose conservatively
without communication, the maximin strategies yields (3, 3), which is unstable: both players
unilaterally can improve their outcomes. If either player moves first or commits to move first
they can obtain their best outcome. For example, Rose can obtain (4, 2) which is a Nash
equilibrium. If Rose issues a threat, she can eliminate (2, 4) and obtain (4, 2). A promise by Rose
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eliminates (4, 2) but results in (2, 4) which does not improve the (3, 3) likely outcome without
communication.
8. 1. A combination threat and promise
Consider the following game:
  Colin  
 C1  C2 
R1 (2, 4)  (3, 3) 
Rose    
R2 (1, 2)  (4, 1) 
Table 9. Rose versus Colin payoffs.
The movement diagram shows that (2,4). is the Nash equilibrium. Without communication,
Colin gets his best outcome, but can Rose do better that (2, 4) with a strategic move?
Rose First If Rose moves R1, Colin should respond with C1 yielding (2, 4). If Rose moves R2,
Colin responds with C1 yielding (1, 2). Rose’s best choice is (2, 4), no better than the likely
conservative outcome without communication.
Rose Threat Rose wants Colin to play C2. Normally, if Colin plays C1, Rose plays R1 yielding
(2, 4). To hurt herself she must play R2 yielding (1, 2). Comparing the normal (2, 4) and (1, 2),
the threat is contingent upon Colin playing C1, hurts Rose and hurts Colin. It is a threat and
effectively eliminates (2, 4) yielding
Colin
C1 C2
R1 eliminated (3, 3)
Rose
 
R2 (1, 2)
 
(4, 1)
Table 10. Result of threat alone by Rose.
Does the threat deter Colin from playing C1? Examining the movement diagram, If Colin plays
C1 the outcome is (1, 2). If Colin plays C2 the outcome is (4, 1). Colin’s best choice is still C1.
Thus there is a threat, but it does not work. Does Rose have a promise that works by itself?
Rose Promise Rose wants Colin to play C2. Normally, if Colin plays C2, Rose plays R2 yielding
(4, 1). To hurt herself she must play R1 yielding (3, 3). Comparing the normal (4, 1) with the
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promised (3, 3), the move is contingent upon Colin playing C2, hurts Rose and is beneficial to
Colin. It is a promise and effectively eliminates (4, 1) yielding
Colin
C1 C2
R1 (2, 4)
 
(3, 3)
Rose
 
R2 (1, 2) eliminated
Table 11. Result from promise alone by Rose.
Does the promise motivate Colin to play C2? Examining the movement diagram, if Colin plays
C1 the outcome is (2, 4). If Colin plays C2 the outcome is (3, 3). Colin’s best choice is still C1
for (2, 4). Thus there is a promise, but it does not work. What about combining both the threat
and the promise?
Combination Threat and Promise We see that Rose does have a threat that eliminates an
outcome but does not work by itself. She also has a promise that eliminates an outcome but
does not work by itself. In such situations, we can examine issuing both the threat and the
promise to eliminate two outcomes to determine if a better outcome results. Rose’s threat
eliminates (2, 4), and Rose’s promise eliminates (4, 1). If she issues both the threat and the
promise, the following outcomes are available.
Colin
C1 C2
R1 eliminated (3, 3)
Rose
R2 (1, 2) eliminated
Table 12. Result of combination of threat and promise.
If Colin plays C1 the result is (1, 2), and choosing C2 yields (3, 3). He should choose C2, and (3,
3) represents an improvement for Rose over the likely outcome without communication (2, 4).
Credibility Of course, commitments to first moves, threats and promises must be made
credible. If Rose issues a threat, and Colin chooses to Not Swerve anyway, will Rose will carry
out her threat and crash (1, 1) even though that action no longer promises to get her the outcome
(4, 2)? If Colin believes that she will not carry through on her threat, he will ignore the threat.
In the game of Chicken, if Rose and Colin both promise to Swerve and Colin believes Rose’s
promise and executes Swerve, will Rose carry out her promise to Swerve and accept (3, 3) even
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though (4, 2) is still available to her? One method for Rose to gain credibility is to lower one
or more of her payoffs so that it is obvious to Colin that she will execute the stated move. Or,
if possible, she may make a side payment to Colin to increase his selected payoffs in order to
entice him to a strategy that is favorable to her and is now favorable to him because of the side
payment. These ideas are pursued further in the exercises.
An inventory of the strategic moves available to each player is an important part of determining
how a player should act. Each player wants to know what strategic moves are available to each
of them. For example if Rose has a first move and Colin has a threat, Rose will want to execute
her first move before Colin issues his threat. The analysis requires knowing the rank order of
the possible outcomes for both players. Once a player has decided which strategy he wants
the opposing player to execute, he can then determine how the player will react to any of his
moves.
As alluded earlier maybe the better option is to go to arbitration. We discuss that next.
9. Nash arbitration
In the bargaining problem, Nash (1950) developed a scheme for producing a single fair
outcome. The goals for the Nash arbitrations scheme are that the result will be at or above the
status quo point for each player and that the result must be “fair”.
Nash introduced the following terminology:
Status Quo Point (We will typically use the intersection of Rose’s Security Level and Colin’s
Security Level; the Threat positions may also be used).
Negotiation Set: Those points in the Pareto Optimal Set that are at or above the “Status Quo”
of both players.
We use Nash’s four axioms that he believed that a reasonable arbitration scheme should satisfy
rationality, linear invariance, symmetry, and invariance. A good discussion of these axioms
and can be found in Straffin (2004, p.104-105). Simply put the Nash Arbitration point is the
point that follows all four axioms. This leads to Nash’s Theorem stated below:
Nash’s Theorem: There is one and only one arbitration scheme which satisfies Axioms 1
through 4. It is this: if the status quo SQ =(x0, y0),  then the arbitrated solution point N is the
point (x, y) in the polygon with x ≥ x0 and y ≥ y0 which maximizes the product: (x − x0)(y − y0).
Let’s examine this geometrically first as it will provide insights into using calculus methods.
We produce the contour plot of our nonlinear function: (x − x0)(y − y0) when our status quo
point is assumed to be (0,0). It is obvious that the northeast (NE) corner of quadrant 1 is where
this function is maximized. This is illustrated in figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. Contour plot for (x*y). We note that the direction of maximum increase is NE as indicated by the arrow.
We need a few more definitions to use this Nash Arbitration.
In his theory for the arbitration and cooperative solutions, Nash (1950) stated the “reasonable”
solution should be Pareto optimal and will be at or above the security level. The set of outcomes
that satisfy these two conditions is called the negotiation set. The line segments that join the
negotiation set must form: a convex region as shown in Nash’s proof. Methodologies for
solving for this point use basic calculus, algebra, and geometry.
For any game theory problem, we next overlay the convex polygon onto our contour plot. The
most NE point in the feasible region is our optimal point and the Nash Arbitration point. This
will be where the feasible region is tangent to the hyperbola. It will always be on the line
segment that joins the negotiation set. This is simply a constrained optimization problem. We
can convert to a single variable problem as we will illustrate later in our example.
In our example, we will use the security value as the status quo point to use in the Nash
arbitration procedure. We additionally define the procedure to find the security value as
follows:
In a non-zero-sum game, Rose’s optimal strategy in Rose’s game is called Rose’s Prudential
Strategy, the value is called Rose’s Security level. Colin’s optimal strategy in Colin’s game is
called Colin’s Security level. We will illustrate this during the solution to find the Nash
arbitration point in the following example.
To find the security level (status quo point) we look at the following two separate games
extracted from the original game and use movement diagrams, dominance, or our linear
programming method to solve each game for those players’ values.
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In a prudential strategy, we allow a player to find their optimal strategy in their own game.
For Rose, she would need to find her optimal solution in her own game. Rose’s game below
has a mixed strategy solution; V=10/3.
Colin
C D
Rose A 2 10
B 4 0
Table 14. Rose’s game for finding her Prudential strategy.
For Colin, he would need to find his optimal solution in his own game. Colin’s game below
has a pure strategy solution, V=6.
Colin
C D
Rose A 6 5
B 8 0
Table 15. Colin’s game for finding his Prudential strategy.
The status quo point or security level from the Prudential strategy is found to be (10/3, 6). We
will use this point in the formulation of the Nash arbitration.
10. Finding the Nash arbitration point
We use the nonlinear programming method described by Fox (2010,2012). We set up the
convex polygon (constraints) for the function that we want to maximize, which is
(x − 103 )⋅ (y −6). The convex polygon is the convex set from the values in the pay-off matrix.
Its boundary and interior points represent all possible combinations of strategies. Corner
points represent pure strategies. All other points are mixed strategies. Occasionally, a pure
Colin
C D
Rose A (2,6) (10,5)
B (4,8) (0,0)
Table 13. Finding the security levels in a non-zero sum game
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strategy is an interior point. Thus, we start by plotting the strategies from our payoff matrix
set of values { (2,6), (4,8), (10,5), (0,0)}, see figure 2.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Series1
(0,0)
(10,5)
(4.8)
(2,6)
Figure 2. Payoff Polygon,
We note that our convex region has four sides whose coordinates are our pure strategies. We
use the point-slope formula to find the equations of the line and then test points to transform
the equations to inequalities. For example, the line form (4,8) to (10,5) is y =
-.5 x + 10. We rewrite as y +.5x =10. Our test point (0, 0) shows that our inequality is
0.5x + y ≤10. We use this technique to find all boundary lines as well as add our security levels
as lines that we need to be above.
The convex polygon is bounded by the following in equalities:
− .5x + y ≤10
−3x + y ≤0
0.5x − y ≤0
− x + y ≤4
x ≥ x *
y ≥ y *
where x* and y* are the security levels (10/3,6).
The NLP formulation (Winston, 2003; Fox, 2012) to find the Nash arbitration value following
the format of equation is as follows:
Maximize
(x − 103 )⋅ (y −6) (4)
Subject to:
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0.5x + y ≤10
−3x + y ≤0
0.5x − y ≤0
− x + y ≤4
x ≥ 103
y ≥6
We display the feasible region graphically in Figure 3 The feasible region is the solid region.
From the figure we can approximate the solution as the point of tangency between the feasible
region and the hyperbolic contours in the NE region.
Optimal solution is the point of tangency.
Figure 3. Convex polygon and function contour plot.
Since we visually see that the solution must fall along the line segment y=-0.5 x+ 10. We may
use simple calculus.
Maximize (x − 103 )⋅ (y −6)
Subject to: y = − .5x + 10
We substitute to obtain a function of one variable,
Maximize (x −10 / 3)((− .5x + 10−6) or
Maximize 5x 2 +  34 / 6 x –  40 / 3
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We find dfdx =0= - x + 34 / 6.
We find x=17/3
The second derivative test confirms we found a maximum.
We substitute x= 17/3 back into y=-.5x+10 to obtain y= 43/6. This point (17/3, 43/6) is the Nash
Arbitration point. Our optimal solution, the Nash arbitration point is found to be x =5.667 and
y = 7.167 and the value of the objective function payoff of 2.72.
How do we obtain this value in a particle manner? An arbitrator plays the strategies BC (4,8)
and AD (10,5) as follows described below.
We can solve two equations and two unknowns from our strategies BC and AD equal to our
Nash arbitration point.
4 10
8 5
x
y =
5.667
7.167
We solve and find x = 0.27777 or (5/18) y = 0.72222 or 13/18.
Example 2: Management-Labor Arbitration (Straffin, 2004 p 115-117)
Labor
Concedes
Nothing C A CA
Nothing (0,0) (4,-1) (4,-2) (8,-3)
Management
Concedes P (-2,2) (2,1) (2,0) (6,-1)
R (-3,3) (1,2) (1,1) (5,0)
PR (-5,5) (-1,4) (-1,3) (3,2)
Table 16. Management-versus Labour problem
The convex polygon is graphed from the constraints below (see the plots in figures 4):
x + y ≥0
0.5x + y ≥0
0.25x + y ≥ −1
x + y ≥5
0.5x + y ≤3.5
0.25x + y ≤ 154
The status quo point (our security level) is (0,0), making the function to maximize simply x* y.
Our formulation is:
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Maximize x*y
Subject to::
x + y ≥0
0.5x + y ≥0
0.25x + y ≥ −1
x + y ≥5
0.5x + y ≤3.5
0.25x + y ≤ 154
The product is xy=6 and the values are x=3 and y=2.
Figure 4. The graphical NLP problem for the Management-Labor Arbitration.
This optimal point is the point (3,2) on the line that is tangent to the contours in the direction
of the NE increase.
10. N–person games
We restrict our discussion to the three person games. We suggest placing the payoffs into
payoff matrices as shown in Table 17. We will continue to use Rose and Colin but introduce
Larry as our third player. We show with only two strategies each but the concept can be
expanded.
Engineering Management62
Larry, L1 Larry, L2
Colin Colin
C1 C2 C1 C2
Rose R1 (r1,c1,l1) (r1,c2,l1) R1 (r1,c1,l2) (r1,c2,l2)
R2 (r2,c1,l1) (r1,c2,l1) R2 (r2,c1,l2) (r2,c2,l2)
Table 17. Three-person game.
Again if ri+ci+li = 0 or the same constant for all i we have a total sum game otherwise we have
a partial sum game.
Movement diagram may again be used to examine the game for pure strategy solution. Arrow
point from the small values to the larger values. The new arrows belong to Larry. Between
Larry 1 and Larry 2 we draw arrows from smaller to larger by an arrow out from one matrix
and an arrow in to the other. We will illustrate with an example. Regardless if there is a pure
solution or solutions or not, we will still consider coalitions. A coalition will be one two players
joins together to gain an advantage of a third player. We consider all such coalition in our
analysis.
Example Three Person Total Conflict
Consider the following three person total conflict game between Rose, Colin, and Larry. We
provide the payoffs and the movement diagram with all arrows.
 
  Larry L1  
  Colin  
  C1 C2 
Rose R1 (2,2,-4) (-1,3,-2) 
 R2 (3,-4,1) (2,-2,0) 
    
 
  Larry L2  
  Colin  
  C1 C2 
Rose R1 (-1,0,1) (-2,-1,3) 
 R2 (-2,3,-1) (2,1,-3) 
    
 
Table 18. Movement diagram for our three person game example.
Our movement arrows indicate two stable pure strategies, R2C1L1 (3,-4,1) and R1C1L2 (-1,0,1).
These results are very different and not all players are satisfied at one or the other points. We
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now consider coalitions. We completely illustrate one coalition and provide the results for the
others.
Let’s assume that Larry and Colin form a coalition against Rose. Our new payoff matrix would
look as follows:
Colin & Larry
Rose C1L1 C2L1 C1L2 C2L2
R1 2,-2 -1,1 -1,1 -2,2
R2 3,-3 2,-2 -2,2 2,-2
Table 19. Colin and Larry coalition payoffs.
As a zero-sum game we may just list Rose’s values.
Colin & Larry
Rose C1L1 C2L1 C1L2 C2L2
R1 2 -1 -1 -2
R2 3 2 -2 2
Table 20. Colin and Larry coalition payoffs as a zero-sum game.
We can use linear programming to obtain our solution for Rose. Since payoffs are negative so
that we solution can negative we employ the transformation of Vr to
V r1−V r2.
Maximize Vr1-Vr2
Subject to:
2y1− y2− y3−2y4−  V r1−V r2r ≥0
3y1 + 2y2−2y3 + 2y4−  V r1−V r2≥0
y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 =1
yi, V r1−V r2≥0
We find the optimal solution is Vr1=0, V=1.2 so Vr=-1.2 when y1=0, y2 =0, y3=4/5 and y4=1/5. Thus,
the coalition of Colin-Larry gains 1.2 units where we find Larry get 21/25 of the share and Colin
gets 9/25 of the share.
For the other coalitions, we may use the same procedures. Also, we may use the same
procedures if we have a three person partial conflict game. However, for those coalitions we
must use the (M,N) formulations since M+N does not equal zero.
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